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The Justice Observatory Journal (JOJ) The National Judicial Council: Weaving A Patchwork of Praiseworthy Accomplishments and Ruinous Shortfalls |
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By Oluwatoyin Badejogbin Set up by the General Sanni Abacha junta in 1993, the Justice Kayode Eso Panel grappled with the daunting challenge of working through a five- point mandate aimed at achieving wholesale reforms and reorganization in the Judiciary. Crucial to its work was the challenge of arresting judicial corruption, the perception of which became ingrained and widespread in the aftermath of June 12. A second challenge was finding solutions to perennial delays in justice administration. At the end of a drawn out and painstaking effort, investigating a maze of petitions and studying comparative models of judicial administration, the Justice Eso Panel came up with a set of recommendations that are revolutionizing the face of justice administration in Nigeria. |
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The Justice Eso Panel's recommendations were twofold, one for the removal of 47 (forty-seven) judicial officers it indicted for delinquency and the other for comprehensive structural reforms in the judiciary and in the administration of Justice. However the Justice Eso Report is considered, whether from the viewpoint of its indictments or recommendations for reform, it has left indelible impressions in the Judiciary. And though the report came up
against powerful interests in the Abacha Administration that threatened to silence it, subsequent developments, such as the Justice Babalakin Committee's review of the report, which endorsed significant portions of it would eventually attest to the report's value or at least the resilience and ingenuity of some of its recommendations. The first enduring legacy the Justice Eso Report would bequeath to Nigeria's judicial evolution in fact predates the Justice Babalakin Review Committee. Not too many may be aware that the National Judicial Council we now have under the 1999 Constitution, the first of its kind to be created by a Nigerian Constitution, as well as the centralization of judicial appointments and discipline were ideas articulated by the Justice Eso Panel. The panel had envisioned a National Judicial Council that would manage the affairs of the Judiciary and a National Judicial Service Commission as the central appointing body for all judges, excepting the Chief Justice of Nigeria and State Chief Judges. It also proposed the setting up of a Judicial Performance Commission to monitor the performance of judges and discipline erring judges. The 1999 Constitution which must have been influenced by the Justice Eso recommendations however fused these functions in one federal institution, the National Judicial Council (NJC). The Justice Babalakin Committee's review of the Justice Eso Panel's report acknowledge that the above recommendations had been worked into the 1999 Constitution. The Justice Babalakin's Review Committee however churned out important recommendations of its own. One was for the empanelment of a Monitoring Committee within the framework of the NJC to monitor judges' performance while another urged the establishment of a system for monitoring the declaration of assets by serving judges as a deterrent to corruption on the Bench. A third required that judges aspiring to higher positions in the judiciary should be appointed based on performance and integrity. Two other recommendations were made, with one urging judges to exercise firm control over proceedings in their courts.
Has the Judiciary benefited from the Eso and Babalakin Committees? In a number of ways. The implementation of Justice Eso's recommendations for federalized control of the judiciary, of appointments, discipline and removal of judges, and of funds accruing to the judiciary from the Federation Account has reinforced judicial independence and rekindled public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. Judges, particularly federal court judges, as the 2004 US Country Report on Human Rights in Nigeria affirms, are increasingly asserting their independence against executive interference. Although it is important to consolidate the gains here, these are arguably the most laudable outcomes of the Justice Eso Panel. Justices Eso and Babalakin's recommendation for judicial performance reviews have helped to further improve performance among judges and efficiency in courts. More and more judges are beginning to exercise firmer control over judicial proceedings before them and it is becoming usual for judges to frown at delays and decline requests for long adjournments. Yet another legacy of the Justices Eso and Babalakin Panels is the deterrent effect disciplinary actions meted out by the NJC against erring judges is having on judicial conduct nationwide. In 2002, six judges were removed after the Justice Babalakin Committee ratified their indictments by the Justice Eso Panel. Similar disciplinary measures followed in 2004, when Justices Egbo-Egbo and Nnaji were relieved of their jobs for abusing their judicial discretion. Abuses of ex-parte orders have since become less rampant – it has become virtually unheard of in almost one year. In 2004 also, the NJC sent out a strong warning against judicial corruption with the dismissal of Justices M.M. Adamu, Teryila Ahura (he slumped and died when detectives visited him at his residence), Justice A.M. Elelegwu, Khadi T. Mahmud and Senlong, who were indicted for receiving or offering financial inducements. Investigations into their conduct also indicted Chief Magistrate J. Isede, also a member of the election tribunal, for receiving bribe. Altogether the NJC has taken significant strides in safeguarding the judiciary against insalubrious attacks on its integrity and independence. However, NJC's praiseworthy record of achievements also leaves behind a trail of weaknesses, some of which may be traced to how it construes the recommendations of Justices Eso and Babalakin Panels or implements them. It may be observed for instance, that the NJC's preference for a reactive approach over a preventive and programmatic approach to dealing with judicial delinquency may not be unconnected to the silence of the Justices Eso and Babalakin Panels on how the NJC should approach the detection of vice (a member of the NJC once expressed the rather narrow view that the role of the NJC is to deal with people (judges) who have erred and not to educate or prevent manifestations of judicial impropriety). Consequently, the NJC has often awaited symptomatic manifestations of deep-rooted tendencies that besmirch the judiciary before swinging the baton. Given this default approach, NJC's interventions in crises situations – like the festering crisis of judicial administration in Abia State – can sometimes be inadequate.
The NJC should not assume that responding “reactively” is the most effective way of fighting corruption. While its work no doubt, is helping to purify the judiciary by flushing out delinquents whose cases are brought to its attention, it should remember that there has been no emperical study to show that the perfection of corruption has indeed reduced. On the contrary, insinuations, whether founded or not, of corruption are widening in reach – and even the Supreme Court has not been spared from allegations of this sort1 . Recently too, the NJC itself was at the receiving end when people made far-reaching speculations over why the Council “capitulated” to endorse the Enugu State Governor's preferred candidate for the office of Chief Judge. Although the NJC has explained its deferrence to the Governor, it is not clear that the explanation will erase the doubts that gathered in many people's minds about the event. That avoidable controversies or perceptions of judicial corruption are threatening to invade even more hallowed chambers of the Judiciary should worry the NJC to want to think and act more proactively in the defence of its image and of the judiciary.
Demonstrating consistency, even-handedness and courage in responding to threats against the judiciary is yet another challenge before the NJC, which is beginning to garner the unhealthy reputation for adopting or producing strangely conflicting procedures and outcomes in its interventions in substantially similar situations, as the appointments of the Chief Judges for Kano and Enugu States would illustrate. In 2001 when the NJC appointed the current Kano State Chief Judge, Hon. Justice Adamu Chiroma, the State Governor put up a nine-month battle to override the NJC's choice for the office. Yet the NJC stood by its choice, and appointed an Acting Chief Judge, Hon. Justice Saka to act in that capacity until the Executive Governor relented. Fortunately then, the State House of Assembly did not decline NJC's choice for the office. In substantially similar circumstances this year however – except that in this case the State House of Assembly cooperated with the Governor's schemes - the NJC, capitulated to the Enugu State Governor in the appointment of the current Chief Judge of the State, without putting its foot down in defence of its choice for the office. So one wonders whether the NJC has shortchanged itself too much, and too often, or whether it has deferred too much to other branches of government at the cost of its own authority? One way (though not the only way) we can look at this is by examining what is happening recently in Oyo State where the Chief Judge, Justice Isaiah Olakanmi was removed. Following certain allegations against His Lordship, the State Judical Service Commmission asked the Chief Judge to proceed on suspension and set up a panel to investigate the allegations. While the investigations were taking place, Chief Justice Uwais, Chairman of the NJC, wrote the Executive Governor, Oyo State, to warn that the disciplinary measures purported to be taken by the State's Judicial Service Commission were unconstitutional as only the NJC had constitutional powers to investigate the Chief Judge. Riding roughshod over NJC's advice however, the Oyo State Government proceeded to dismiss the Chief Judge, acting on an address of the State House of Assembly calling for his removal. The “removal” was both in disregard of NJC's intervention and a brash usurpation of NJC's constitutional oversight roles.
Sometimes NJC's shortfalls arise from its failure to act resolutely and expeditiously in appropriate cases, as was required in Abia State, where the Chief Judge is waging a ferocious campaign of persecution against officials of the Abia State Branch of the Court Registrars Association of Nigeria (CRAN). The CRAN officials had blown the whistle on the Chief Judge, Justice Amah's delinquency, first to the NJC which merely reprimanded him, and subsequently to the Abia State House of Assembly which indicted and recommended his removal.
But using his office as Chief Judge and Chairman of the Judicial Service Commission, the embittered Chief Judge has sustained his delinquent administration and vindictive campaign against the CRAN officials for three years now. It is striking to observe that the NJC has shown irresolution in its response to the crisis, and looked the other way even after damning indictments by the Abia State House of Assembly against Justice Amah and his reprisals against the CRAN officials were brought to its attention. On one other occasion when Justice Moshood Abass withdrew from the murder trial of former Justice Minister, Chief Bola Ige, the NJC failed to demonstrate that it had the verve to act in defense of judges whose independence and integrity are threatened by litigants before them. The NJC was mum on the Judge's highly publicized disclosure of threats and inducements. What challenges do these all present? First is that the NJC needs to show greater consistency in its interventions, especially against the growing perception that it can be influenced by powerful political interests. Such perceptions are capable of eroding the reputation and public confidence it has earned through hard work. The NJC cannot afford to send mixed messages about its readiness and ability to uphold the independence and integrity of the Judiciary. Secondly, the NJC must also realize that while several other actors are in the business of helping it succeed, others will desperately want to exploit it. The Council should therefore take a more proactive, and determined approach to maintaining its independence and integrity. It must also refrain from actions or omissions capable of being interpreted in a manner that hurts its reputation. On this note, the NJC would do well to treat with deserving urgency the lingering crisis of justice administration in Abia State which has seriously hurt the Council's credibility in the State.
Justice it is said, is not a cloistered virtue. Perhaps the NJC's most effective approach to image-building could be to adopt a more robust public communications strategy. The NJC must not let serious matters it could have explained get into the rumour mills, neither must it, objectively, feed those mills by the inconsistencies of its own making. It may also help to stave off integrity attacks on the judiciary if the NJC evolves a system to monitor events in the judiciary and respond to situations that threaten judicial integrity and independence long before such threats objectify. The NJC may for instance, empanel a “Circuit” Committee that travels, perhaps every month, from one state to another as the Justice Eso Panel did, to hear first hand, from judges, lawyers, etc, what the fears, concerns and problems against or by judges are. That way, NJC can nip problems – like the allegation against the embattled Oyo State Chief Judge that he did not hold regular consultations with his brother judges - in the bud, and attract wider awareness of its functions. 1. And though police authorities recently released a report of their investigations which all but dispelled claims by the Derivation Front that the Supreme Court compromised its integrity in the Chief James Onanefe Ibori ex-convict case – the report confirms but does not resolve the mystery surrounding the leakage of the Supreme Court's judgment in the case - it may take a while for the Apex Court to dispel the odium that the allegation spawned.
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